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INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY VS.  
THE “LABELING GAME” APPROACH: 
KING V. GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY AND THE 
BENEFITS OF APPLYING HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY TO 
PROFESSIONAL SPEECH 
 
Patrick Bannon* 
 
In previous cases dealing with First Amendment challenges to laws 
regulating the speech of professionals, the Supreme Court has failed to 
articulate a coherent “professional speech doctrine,” neither fully 
defining the term nor identifying the appropriate level of scrutiny. A trio 
of recent appellate court decisions—Pickup v. Brown in the Ninth 
Circuit, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida in the Eleventh Circuit 
and King v. Governor of New Jersey in the Third Circuit—highlight the 
problems caused by this ambiguity and lack of guidance. All three courts 
upheld the laws challenged in the respective cases but all applied 
different reasoning in coming to their conclusions. The Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits labeled the regulated verbal communications 
“conduct” and applied rational basis review. The Third Circuit, 
however, applied an intermediate level of scrutiny, recognizing that First 
Amendment rights were implicated.  
This Note argues that the intermediate scrutiny standard articulated 
by the Third Circuit in King resolves the ambiguity created by the 
Supreme Court in its professional speech cases and forecloses the 
possibility that courts will be able to label the verbal communications of 
professionals as either speech or conduct without any doctrinal basis for 
doing so. This Note concludes that an intermediate scrutiny approach 
ultimately provides greater protection for the interests at stake in laws 
regulating professional speech—interests such as the First Amendment 
rights of professionals, the right of patients and clients to receive 
beneficial information, and the responsibility of the state to protect its 
citizens through its police powers. 
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate Brooklyn Law School 2016; M.A. Fordham University 2012; 
B.A. University of Scranton 2010. I would like to thank the Journal staff for 
their help throughout the editing process and my parents, Jay and Tracy Bannon, 
for their constant encouragement and support.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In September of 2012, California passed Senate Bill 1172 (“SB 
1172”) which stated that “[u]nder no circumstances shall a mental 
health provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a 
patient under 18 years of age.”1 The statute defined sexual 
orientation change efforts (“SOCE”) as “any practices . . . that seek 
to change an individual’s sexual orientation.”2 In enacting the law, 
the legislature relied upon publications by medical organizations 
like the American Medical Association, the American 
Psychological Association, and the American Psychiatric 
Association,3 which not only denounced the legitimacy of SOCE 
as a medical practice but also warned of the serious harms 
associated with it—harms which include depression, suicidality, 
and substance abuse.4 California recognized its “compelling 
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of 
minors, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth” 
and targeted the statute specifically to prevent their “exposure to 
the serious harms caused by [SOCE].”5 SB 1172 immediately 
incited a First Amendment challenge and the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in upholding the law as a valid regulation of professional 
conduct demonstrates the problems surrounding laws restricting 
the speech of professionals. This Note will discuss the ambiguity 
surrounding challenges to laws that regulate the speech of 
physicians and will argue that the Supreme Court’s failure to fully 
articulate a “professional speech doctrine” has caused confusion 
among lower courts with the potential for problematic 
consequences.   
In two separate cases filed in the Eastern District of 
California—Welch v. Brown6 and Pickup v. Brown7—SOCE 
practitioners, SOCE patients and their parents, and SOCE 
                                                            
1 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2014). 
2 Id. § 865. 
3 See S.B. 1172, 2011–2012 Sess., § 1 (b)–(d), (g) (Cal. 2012). 
4 Id. § 1 (b), (d). 
5 Id. § 1 (n). 
6 Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
7 Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012). 
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advocacy organizations8 claimed that, because SOCE consisted 
only of verbal communications between the physicians and 
patients, SB 1172 violated their First Amendment rights. In Welch, 
Judge William Shubb granted a preliminary injunction, holding 
that the SB 1172 should be subjected to strict scrutiny, and that it 
would likely not satisfy that standard.9 Conversely, in Pickup v. 
Brown, Judge Kimberly Mueller denied a preliminary injunction,10 
holding that SB 1172 regulated conduct,11 that rational basis 
should apply,12 and that the law would satisfy that standard.13 The 
judges ultimately came to opposite conclusions, but both 
significantly began their analysis by characterizing the verbal 
communications in question as either speech or conduct, a 
characterization which determined the standard of review.  
The Ninth Circuit, in Pickup v. Brown,14 combined the cases 
and ultimately affirmed the ruling of Judge Mueller, denying the 
injunction on the same grounds.15 Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain, 
however, rejected the panel’s reasoning and argued that the court 
should apply a heightened standard of review as speech rights were 
implicated.16 Judge O’Scannlain criticized the panel’s holding and 
warned of the problematic17 consequences that would result if 
courts could label the verbal communication of physicians as either 
conduct or speech without any “principled doctrinal basis” for 
                                                            
8 In Welch, plaintiffs included two SOCE practitioners and a former SOCE 
patient who had intended to become a SOCE practitioner. Welch, 907 F. Supp. 
2d at 1106. In Pickup, plaintiffs included SOCE practitioners, SOCE patients 
and their parents, and two SOCE advocacy organizations—The National 
Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”) and the 
American Association of Christian Counselors (“AACC”). Pickup, 2012 WL 
6021465, at *1. 
9 Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. 
10 Pickup, 2012 WL 6021465, at *1. 
11 Id. at 9. 
12 Id. at 12. 
13 Id. 
14 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013). 
15 Id. at 1222. 
16 Id. at 1218 (“SB 1172 prohibits certain ‘practices’ . . . but with regard to 
[plaintiffs], those laws targeted speech. Thus, the First Amendment still 
applies.”). 
17 Id. at 1221. 
652 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
doing so.18 As indicated by the conflicting positions taken by 
Judges Shubb and Mueller, this “labeling game”19 would allow 
courts to “declare . . . categories of speech outside the scope of the 
First Amendment” and also permit them to undermine the ability 
of the states to regulate harmful practices like SOCE by subjecting 
statutes like SB 1172 to the difficult strict scrutiny standard.20   
In the past, the Supreme Court has considered challenges to 
laws regulating the verbal communications of physicians and other 
professionals, but it has never espoused a coherent professional 
speech doctrine. The Court has neither provided a definition of 
“professional speech” nor identified the applicable standard of 
review for laws regulating it, resulting in confusion among lower 
courts. The Fourth Circuit, in Moore-King v. County of 
Chesterfield, VA., stated that “[u]nder the professional speech 
doctrine, the government can license and regulate those who would 
provide services to their clients for compensation without running 
afoul of the First Amendment.”21 The court used this 
understanding of the “professional speech doctrine” in applying 
rational basis review to a spiritual advisor’s First Amendment 
challenge to a zoning ordinance that prohibited her practice.22 The 
Middle District of North Carolina, however, ruled that “what 
‘professional speech’ means and the degree of protection it 
receives” has not been defined, as “the phrase has been used by 
Supreme Court justices only in passing.”23 The court ultimately 
applied strict scrutiny and enjoined the enforcement of an informed 
consent abortion statute that required physicians to display an 
ultrasound to a woman seeking an abortion and describe the 
images in detail.24 Scholars discussing the contours of the Supreme 
Court’s amorphous “professional speech” jurisprudence have 
defined the term as speech “uttered in the course of professional 
                                                            
18 Id. at 1215–16. 
19 Id. at 1218. 
20 Id. at 1221 (citations omitted).  
21 Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, Va., 708 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 
2013) (applying rational basis review to a spiritual advisor’s First Amendment 
free speech challenge to a zoning ordinance that prohibited her practice).  
22 Id. at 572. 
23 Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011). 
24 Id. at 432.  
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practice,”25 but they have also recognized that the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of such speech is “undoubtedly incomplete.”26 This lack 
of guidance allows lower courts to arbitrarily characterize the 
verbal communications of professionals as either speech or 
conduct, characterizations which result in either the application of 
strict scrutiny or rational basis review.  
Pickup v. Brown, and two other recent federal appellate court 
decisions—Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida27 and King v. 
Governor of the State of New Jersey28—all demonstrate this 
problem and reveal the benefits that would accompany a more 
coherent professional speech doctrine. In Wollschlaeger v. 
Governor of Florida, physicians and physician-advocacy groups 
challenged a Florida statute prohibiting “irrelevant inquiry and 
record-keeping by physicians regarding firearms.”29 Prompted by 
an incident in which a pediatrician terminated a professional 
relationship with a mother who refused to answer routine questions 
regarding firearms,30 the Florida legislature argued that the law 
was necessary to prevent harassment of firearm owners and 
preserve their access to health care.31 The plaintiffs argued that the 
statute violated their First Amendment rights as it constituted a 
“speaker- and content-based restriction[] on speech.”32 
                                                            
25 See David Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and 
the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 771, 843 
(1999). Halberstam’s analysis of the Court’s professional speech jurisprudence 
has been influential and other academics have adopted his definition of 
professional speech as well. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and 
Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled 
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2368 (2013) (recognizing that 
Hablerstam’s article was the first to address “the First Amendment’s interaction 
with professional speech”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First 
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 
947 (2007) (explicitly adopting Halberstam’s definition of professional speech). 
26 Post, supra note 25, at 952. 
27 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014). 
28 King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014). 
29 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203. 
30 Id. at 1204 n.2. 
31 Id. at 1204. 
32 Id. at 1205. See also Brief for Appellees Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger, et al., 
760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-14009-FF), 2012 WL 5457590, at *14 
654 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found the act “a legitimate 
regulation of professional conduct.”33 Mirroring the Ninth Circuit 
in Pickup, and relying on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the court 
upheld the statute without applying any heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny.34 In a lengthy dissent, Judge Charles Wilson 
criticized the majority opinion, arguing that the statute proscribed 
First Amendment protected speech and that the court should 
therefore subject the law to at least intermediate scrutiny.35 Unlike 
his dissenting counterpart in Pickup, Judge Wilson analyzed the 
statute on the merits under the intermediate scrutiny standard, by 
which the statute could not pass constitutional muster.36  
  In King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, the Third 
Circuit heard a challenge to a statute similar to the statute at issue 
in Pickup.37 New Jersey Assembly Bill 3371 (“A3371”) prohibited 
licensed mental health providers from engaging in SOCE with 
persons under age eighteen.38 Plaintiffs39 brought a First 
Amendment challenge using the same rationale as the plaintiffs in 
Pickup.40 The Third Circuit, however, agreed with the plaintiffs 
that the law regulated speech—not conduct—for purposes of the 
First Amendment.41 The court then concluded that the First 
Amendment did not fully protect the “speech that occurs as part of 
a licensed profession”42 and that intermediate scrutiny should 
apply.43 After a thorough analysis of the SOCE law, the Third 
Circuit held that the statute satisfied the standard as it “directly 
                                                            
(describing that speaker- and content-based restrictions on speech are forbidden 
by the First Amendment unless they can satisfy strict scrutiny).  
33 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203 (emphasis added). 
34 See id. at 1217. 
35 Id. at 1230 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
36 Id. 
37 See King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014).  
38 Id. at 221. 
39 Plaintiffs included two SOCE practitioners and the same two 
organizations who challenged California’s SB 1172 in Pickup—NARTH and the 
AACC. Id. 
40 See id. at 222.  
41 Id. at 229. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 237. 
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advance[d]” the state’s “stated interest” and that it was no “more 
extensive than necessary to protect that interest.”44 Significantly, 
the Third Circuit provided a clear definition of the bounds of 
professional speech and clearly identified intermediate scrutiny as 
the appropriate standard of review.45 
This Note will examine these three opinions in an attempt to 
demonstrate the problems that emerge from the Supreme Court’s 
“undoubtedly incomplete”46 definition of professional speech. 
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the definition and intermediate 
scrutiny standard adopted by the Third Circuit in King resolve this 
problematic ambiguity in a way that better protects the interests at 
stake in professional speech cases. Part I will provide an overview 
of the Supreme Court’s professional speech jurisprudence. This 
part will address the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate any 
definition of professional speech, and will also address the Court’s 
concomitant lack of guidance to lower courts on the proper 
standard to apply in First Amendment challenges to laws 
implicating professional speech. This Note will focus primarily on 
the cases relied upon by the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in 
their respective opinions. Part II will then discuss Pickup, 
Wollschlaeger, and King in greater depth and assess the merits of 
each court’s rationale. Part III will then propose a solution for the 
current problems with the professional speech doctrine: the 
intermediate scrutiny standard adopted in King, and advocated by 
Judges O’Scannlain and Wilson. This part will first address the 
speech/conduct dichotomy that emerges from the Supreme Court’s 
professional speech jurisprudence and discuss the problems that 
this dichotomy creates. Part III will then demonstrate the benefits 
of the intermediate scrutiny standard as articulated by the Third 
Circuit. By clearly defining professional speech and articulating 
the standard by which it is to be judged the Third Circuit’s 
approach better protects the interests at stake in professional 
speech cases and, as a result, the values underlying the First 
Amendment.  
 
                                                            
44 Id. at 239–40 (citations omitted).  
45 Id. 
46 Post, supra note 25, at 952. 
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I. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SPEECH 
 
The Supreme Court has addressed professional speech but has 
never defined the term or established a legal standard of review for 
analyzing restrictions on its content.47 The Third, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits all looked to a similar collection of cases in 
which the Supreme Court dealt with professional speech, but their 
analyses differed and at times conflicted with one another. The 
circuit courts privileged some of the cases, downplayed the 
significance of others, and, in some instances, ignored cases 
completely. The fact that three different circuits, in cases dealing 
with very similar First Amendment challenges, not only failed to 
apply a single standard, but also failed to determine which 
precedent should govern, only demonstrates how little guidance 
the Supreme Court’s professional speech jurisprudence provides.48  
 
A. Lowe v. S.E.C. and the “Origins” of the Professional 
Speech Doctrine49 
 
Lowe v. S.E.C.50 dealt with S.E.C. restrictions on a person’s 
ability to provide investment advice without being registered under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.51 In this case, the S.E.C. 
revoked the petitioner Lowe’s registration and prohibited him from 
associating with any investment adviser.52  The S.E.C. then filed a 
complaint arguing that Lowe’s publishing of an investment 
newsletter—after his license had been revoked—violated the Act 
                                                            
47 See Halberstam, supra note 25, at 843–49. 
48 See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (“Just 
what ‘professional speech’ means and the degree of protection it receives is even 
less clear; the phrase has been used by Supreme Court justices only in 
passing.”). The discussion below is not comprehensive with regard to the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of professional speech, but it does present some of 
the cases that the circuit courts found applicable. 
49 See Keighley, supra note 25, at 2368 (“Justice White’s concurrence in 
Lowe is often invoked as setting forth the contours of the ‘professional speech 
doctrine,’ to the extent that such a doctrine exists.”). 
50 Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
51 Id. at 183. 
52 Id.  
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and their revocation order.53 As Justice Stevens framed the issue in 
his majority opinion, “[t]he question is whether [Lowe and other 
petitioners] may be permanently enjoined from publishing 
nonpersonalized investment advice and commentary in securities 
newsletters because they are not registered as investment advisers 
under § 203(c) of the Investment Advisers Act.”54 The majority 
expressly declined to address the First Amendment question, 
deciding the case on statutory grounds, and thus finding no reason 
to resolve any lurking constitutional infirmity.55 Justice White, 
joined by Justices Rehnquist and Burger, disagreed with the 
majority’s narrow construction of the statute56 and framed the issue 
as a constitutional one, involving “a collision between the power of 
government to license and regulate those who would pursue a 
profession or vocation and the rights of freedom of speech and of 
the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”57 The three justices 
concurred in the result—refusing to enjoin Lowe and others—but 
did so on the grounds that enjoining the petitioners “from 
publishing . . . [was] inconsistent with the First Amendment.”58 In 
coming to this conclusion, Justice White took a contextual 
approach, arguing that in cases involving regulations restricting 
professional speech, courts should look to the relationship that 
exists between the professional and the client.59   
 
                                                            
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 211. Justice Stevens concluded that the petitioners could not be 
permanently enjoined because the publications fell within a “statutory 
exclusion” to the Investment Advisers Act. Id. 
56 Id. at 226 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s zeal to avoid the 
narrow constitutional issue presented by the case leads it to adopt a construction 
of the Act that, wholly unnecessarily, prevents what would seem to be desirable 
and constitutional applications of the Act-a result at odds with our longstanding 
policy of construing securities regulation enactments broadly and their 
exemptions narrowly in order to effectuate their remedial purposes.”). 
57 Id. at 228. 
58 Id. at 211.  
59 Id. at 232. See also Halberstam, supra note 25, at 834–35 (arguing that 
the Supreme Court cases which have dealt with professional speech, including 
Lowe v. S.E.C., “may be read as having applied a contextual approach centered 
around the roles of speaker and listener”). 
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Justice White acknowledged the “power of the government to 
regulate the professions” even when “the practice of a profession 
entails speech,”60 but he also recognized that at a certain point a 
legitimate regulation of a profession will restrict speech so much 
that it violates the First Amendment.61 Justice White maintained 
that the “professional’s speech [was] incidental to the conduct of 
the profession” when that professional was “engaging in the 
practice of [that] profession.”62 According to Justice White, 
therefore, “generally applicable licensing provisions . . . [could 
not] be said to [create] a limitation on freedom of speech or the 
press subject to First Amendment scrutiny.”63 On the other hand, 
when “the personal nexus between professional and client [did] not 
exist” government regulation became “a regulation of speaking or 
publishing . . . subject to the First Amendment.”64 Despite this 
attempt to establish a line between the type of professional 
relationship in which the speech is protected and the type in which 
it is merely incidental to conduct, the Supreme Court has not used 
the Lowe concurrence to establish a coherent professional speech 
doctrine.65  
This ambiguity has allowed for the development of Judge 
O’Scannlain’s “labeling game” problem, by which courts can 
arbitrarily use the speech/conduct dichotomy to subject the verbal 
communications to either strict scrutiny or rational basis review. 
Neither Judge O’Scannlain nor the panel in Pickup cited Lowe, but 
King and Wollschlaeger rely upon it heavily in their analysis,66 and 
in Wollschlaeger both the majority and dissent use it to support 
                                                            
60 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 229. 
61 Id. at 230 (“At some point, a measure is no longer a regulation of a 
profession but a regulation of speech or of the press; beyond that point, the 
statute must survive the level of scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment.”).  
62 Id. at 232. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See Keighley, supra note 25, at 2367–69 (arguing that, despite its 
prevalence in subsequent cases, Justice White’s concurrence has not allowed for 
the creation of a coherent “professional speech doctrine”). 
66 See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 
2014); King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
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opposite conclusions. The majority held that because the 
questioning and record keeping prohibited by the Florida statute all 
took “place entirely within the confines of the physician-patient 
relationship, where the ‘personal nexus between professional and 
client’ is strong,” they constituted only conduct.67 Judge Wilson, 
on the other hand, argued that such a reading of Justice White’s 
rationale problematically espouses “the far broader principle that 
the right of the professional to speak is lost whenever he is 
practicing his profession”—a principle Lowe itself explicitly 
rejects.68 Despite the Lowe concurrence’s impact on “professional 
speech” jurisprudence, Justice White’s rationale permitted the 
development of the “labeling game” approach, providing courts 
and legislatures with the ability to insulate laws regulating verbal 
communication from any First Amendment scrutiny by merely 
identifying a professional relationship and then labeling the 
communications within that relationship as “conduct.”69  
 
B.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Compelled 
Speech Abortion Cases 
 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of professional speech in the 
medical context has appeared almost exclusively in abortion 
cases.70 The First Amendment implications of these decisions, 
however, have often been overshadowed by the other aspects of 
the Court’s abortion cases.71 In two cases from the 1980’s, City of 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.72 and 
                                                            
67 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, 
J., concurring in the result)). 
68 Id. at 1240 n.9 (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
69 This point is discussed below in Part III.  
70 Halberstam, supra note 25, at 835 (“In the Supreme Court, the most 
sustained discussion about speech in the professions has centered around 
physicians’ speech on the subject of contraception and abortion.”). 
71 Id. As Halberstam notes, the Supreme Court generally focused its 
attention on the issue of whether the patient is exercising a fundamental right 
and the issue of whether “a physician’s constitutional rights are to be subsumed 
under the rights of the patient . . . .” Id. The Court does not discuss the First 
Amendment implications at all in City of Akron and Thornburgh and dismisses 
them in a single paragraph in Casey.   
72 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 442 
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Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists,73 the Court invalidated statutory provisions that 
required physicians to recite certain information in order to obtain 
a patient’s “informed consent” to an abortion. In neither opinion, 
however, did the majority address the First Amendment issues and 
instead struck down the provisions on the ground that they were 
designed not to “inform” but rather to “persuade” a patient to 
withhold her consent.74 A few years later, in Planned Parenthood 
                                                            
(1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). The ordinance stated:  
[T]he woman must be orally informed by her attending 
physician of the status of her pregnancy, the development of 
her fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical and 
emotional complications that may result from an abortion, and 
the availability of agencies to provide her with assistance and 
information with respect to birth control, adoption, and 
childbirth. 
 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The ordinance further stated:  
[T]he attending physician must inform [the woman] of the 
particular risks associated with her own pregnancy and the 
abortion technique to be employed . . . [and] other information 
which in his own medical judgment is relevant to her decision 
as to whether to have an abortion or carry her pregnancy to 
term. 
 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
73 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 760 (1986) overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. The statute in Thornburgh 
required that the physician tell the patient five separate pieces of information 
before “informed consent” could be obtained:  
(a) the name of the physician who will perform the abortion, 
(b) the fact that there may be detrimental physical and 
psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable, (c) 
the particular medical risks associated with the particular 
abortion procedure to be employed, (d) the probable 
gestational age, and (e) the medical risks associated with 
carrying her child to term. 
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
74 City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444 (holding that the statute “extend[ed] the 
State’s interest in ensuring ‘informed consent’ beyond its permissible limits”); 
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765 (“The scope of the information required and its 
availability to the public belie any assertions by the Commonwealth that it is 
advancing any legitimate interest.”). 
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court finally addressed 
the First Amendment concerns in the informed consent statutes and 
held that, despite the physicians’ First Amendment rights, the State 
had the power to regulate their speech so long as the regulation 
was “reasonable.”75 
Although Casey acknowledged that statutes regulating 
physicians’ professional speech implicate the First Amendment, 
the decision has caused confusion both because of the Court’s 
cursory treatment of the issue and because of the lack of guidance 
it ultimately provided.76  The following is the entirety of the Justice 
O’Connor’s treatment of the First Amendment issue, including the 
precedent cited to support her reasoning: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an 
asserted First Amendment right of a physician not 
to provide information about the risks of abortion, 
and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. 
To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights 
not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 
(1977), but only as part of the practice of medicine, 
subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the 
State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603, 97 S. 
Ct. 869, 878, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). We see no 
                                                            
75 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). Casey explicitly overruled the parts of Akron and 
Thornburgh which conflicted with this holding. Id. at 882 (plurality opinion) 
(“To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the 
government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading 
information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and 
those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases go 
too far, are inconsistent with [Roe v. Wade’s] acknowledgment of an important 
interest in potential life, and are overruled.”). 
76 See Halberstam, supra note 25, at 773. (“The passage [dealing with the 
First Amendment issue] tells us the physicians enjoy First Amendment rights 
but provides little guidance about the weight given to the First Amendment 
interests involved.”); see also Keighley, supra note 25, at 2351–61 (2013) 
(suggesting that the Court’s cursory treatment of the First Amendment question 
could have resulted from a lack of attention given to issue in the briefs of both 
the parties and the amici).  
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constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the 
physician provide the information mandated by the 
State here.77 
This brief treatment of the physicians’ First Amendment 
challenge—despite its recognition that compelled speech in the 
medical profession is constitutionally permissible—still failed to 
articulate a clear professional speech doctrine.78 The Court 
acknowledged that the First Amendment rights of professionals are 
diminished when they speak “as part of the practice of medicine,” 
but the opinion also implies that the verbal communications in 
question are speech—not conduct—and that the restrictions on 
those communications must be “reasonable.”79 
As with Lowe, lower courts have found Casey to be a necessary 
part of their professional speech analysis, but they have disagreed 
as to how Casey characterizes professional speech, and what 
standard of review the case proposes. The Ninth Circuit found 
Casey to suggest that, in certain instances of professional speech, 
                                                            
77 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Academics have noted that much of the 
confusion surrounding this passage comes from the Court’s choice of precedent. 
See Post, supra note 25, at 946 (“The passage is puzzling because Wooley is a 
precedent in which the Court applied strict First Amendment scrutiny to a state 
statute that compelled ideological speech, whereas Whalen upheld a New York 
statute requiring physicians to disclose prescriptions for certain drugs, holding in 
the page cited that “[i]t is, of course, well settled that the State has broad police 
powers in regulating the administration of drugs by the health professions. 
Exactly how the strict First Amendment standards of Wooley are meant to 
qualify the broad police power discretion of Whalen is left entirely obscure.”); 
Halberstam, supra note 25, at 773–74 (“The application of Wooley would 
demand a compelling governmental interest to overcome the physician’s First 
Amendment rights, or at least a substantial interest that was unrelated to the 
content of the speech. It would require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to 
that interest as well. The passage cited from Whalen, on the other hand would 
appear to import only the basic due process limitations on nonspeech regulations 
of professionals. To fuse these two models in a shorthand formulation provides 
little indication of how to resolve any professional’s First Amendment claim 
other than the precise one at issue in Casey.”).  
78 Keighley, supra note 25, at 2354 (“The joint opinion’s brief treatment of 
the First Amendment issues raised by the Pennsylvania statute provides minimal 
information about how the Court views the interplay between the state’s ability 
to regulate the medical profession and physicians’ First Amendment rights.”). 
79 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
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First Amendment protection is merely diminished, not 
eliminated.80 The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, used the 
plurality’s reasoning to support its conclusion that the act in 
question regulated professional conduct and therefore did not 
“offend the First Amendment.”81 The Third Circuit determined 
that, “to the extent that Casey applied rational basis review,” it was 
nevertheless inapplicable to New Jersey’s A3371, as the law was 
“a prohibition of speech, not a compulsion of truthful factual 
information.”82  
 
C. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project and the Protection 
of Speech 
 
In Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court addressed a 
federal statute83 that banned providing “material support or 
resources to certain foreign organizations that engage in terrorist 
activity.”84 A group of U.S. citizens and human rights 
organizations challenged the statute on First Amendment free 
speech grounds.85 The plaintiffs stated that they wanted to “provide 
support for the humanitarian and political activities” of two groups 
designated as terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State.86 
Because this support would come in the form of “legal training” 
and “political advocacy” and would be undertaken entirely through 
verbal communication, the plaintiffs claimed that the statute 
violated their First Amendment rights.87 The majority rejected both 
the Government’s argument that the statute regulated only conduct 
and the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute banned “pure political 
                                                            
80 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2013). 
81 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195, 1220 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
82 King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 236 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 650–51 (1985)). 
83 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2014). 
84 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7 (2010) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted).  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 10. 
87 Id. 
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speech.”88 The Court applied strict scrutiny but still found that the 
statute survived this standard.89 The Court, however, explicitly 
limited its holding to the facts before it and recognized that other 
applications of the same statute or other statutes “relating to speech 
and terrorism” may not meet the high standard the Court applied.90  
Humanitarian Law Project fits somewhat uncomfortably with 
professional speech cases because it does not look at the 
relationship between a professional and a client. Although the 
plaintiffs were legal professionals and human rights workers 
looking to provide legal and humanitarian counseling,91 the Court 
did not apply Justice White’s “personal nexus” analysis. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Court did not rely upon any of the 
previous professional speech rationales and not all of the appellate 
court cases discussed above found it applicable.92 Judge 
O’Scannlain93 and the King panel found the case relevant in the 
professional speech context, however, because it “makes clear that 
verbal or written communications, even those that function as 
vehicles for delivering professional services, are ‘speech’ for 
purposes of the First Amendment.”94 According to this rationale, 
Courts cannot simply call verbal or written communication 
“conduct” for the purposes of their analyses and apply rational 
basis review—or no review at all—whenever they find a 
professional-client relationship without subverting the core free-
speech principles of Humanitarian Law Project.95  
                                                            
88 Id. at 25–26. 
89 Id. at 39. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 10.  
92 Neither the majority nor the dissent in Wollschlaeger mentioned the case 
and the panel in Pickup immediately dismissed it as inapposite. See Pickup v. 
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In sharp contrast, Humanitarian 
Law Project pertains to a different issue entirely: the regulation of (1) political 
speech (2) by ordinary citizens.”).  
93 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the order 
denying rehearing en banc) (“The Supreme Court’s implication in Humanitarian 
Law Project is clear: legislatures cannot nullify the First Amendment’s 
protections for speech by playing this labeling game.”). 
94 King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 225–26 (2014). 
95 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1220–21 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the order 
denying rehearing en banc). 
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D. The Commercial Speech Doctrine  
 
While the Supreme Court has failed to fully articulate a 
“professional speech” doctrine, it has developed a commercial 
speech doctrine which is considerably more defined.96 The Court’s 
commercial speech jurisprudence becomes important in the context 
of professional speech as King relies upon it heavily in adopting its 
intermediate scrutiny standard.97 In Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held that commercial speech, defined as speech 
“which does no more than propose a commercial transaction” is 
still entitled to First Amendment protection.98 The Court justified 
protecting this speech on the grounds that commercial speech, even 
in the form of advertising, serves “the particular consumer’s 
interest in the free flow of commercial information.”99 This 
interest, according to the Court, may “may be as keen, if not 
keener by far, than [the consumer’s] interest in the day’s most 
urgent political debate.”100 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court more 
clearly recognized that commercial speech is provided “a lesser 
protection” than “other constitutionally guaranteed expression” and 
is only protected if it is “neither misleading nor related to unlawful 
activity.”101 To defend a statute regulating commercial speech 
                                                            
96 For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the commercial 
speech doctrine, see Halberstam, supra note 25, at 779–92.  
97 See King, 767 F.3d at 234 (“In explaining why [intermediate scrutiny] is 
appropriate, we find it helpful to compare professional speech to commercial 
speech.”). Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (“To the 
extent that there is some commercial or professional speech involved here, it is 
intertwined with non-commercial speech and thus entitled to the full protection 
of the First Amendment.”). See also Keighley, supra note 25, at 2365–66 
(analyzing the analogy to commercial speech and reflecting on its relevance in a 
discussion of professional speech). 
98 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (invalidating a Virginia statute which prohibited 
pharmacists from advertising drug prices on the grounds that it violated the First 
Amendment by suppressing the free flow of prescription drug information). 
99 Id. at 763–64.  
100 Id. at 763. 
101 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
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against the court’s intermediate scrutiny standard, “[t]he state must 
assert a substantial interest to be achieved by [the restriction]” and 
“[t]he limitation on expression must be designed carefully to 
achieve the State’s goal.”102  
Given the lack of Supreme Court guidance regarding 
professional speech and the apparent confusion among circuits, the 
Third Circuit turned to the Court’s commercial speech 
jurisprudence, ultimately concluding “that professional speech 
should receive the same level of First Amendment protection as 
that afforded to commercial speech.”103 Significantly, however, the 
Third Circuit did not contend that commercial speech and 
professional speech were the same type of expression, but merely 
stressed that the same considerations that caused the Supreme 
Court to protect commercial speech with intermediate scrutiny 
were present in the professional speech context.104 First of all, 
professional speech, like commercial speech, “occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation,”105 a fact which 
supports providing it with “diminished [First Amendment] 
protection.”106 Secondly, “professional speech, like commercial 
speech, serves as an important channel for the communication of 
information that might otherwise never reach the public.”107 
Providing some First Amendment protection, therefore, “facilitates 
the ‘the free flow of commercial information,’ in which both the 
                                                            
U.S. 557, 557 (1980). 
102 Id. at 564. The Court would go on to state: 
Compliance with [the intermediate scrutiny standard] may be 
measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly 
advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be 
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for 
the government’s purpose. Second, if the governmental 
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction 
on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot 
survive.  
Id.  
103 King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 235 (3d Cir. 2014). 
104 Id. at 234–35. 
105 Id. at 234 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564). 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
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intended recipients and society at large have a strong interest.”108 
The Third Circuit clearly distinguishes between the two categories 
of speech, and academics have warned about the problems of 
conflating the two,109 but by recognizing the similarities between 
them, the court used the much more coherent commercial speech 
doctrine to adopt an intermediate scrutiny standard for professional 
speech.110  
 
II. RECENT CIRCUIT COURT PROFESSIONAL SPEECH CASES 
 
Despite the many times that the Supreme Court has dealt with 
cases involving a First Amendment challenge to the verbal 
communications of professionals, and despite the considerable 
body of law surrounding commercial speech, the Court has failed 
to adequately address professional speech. The trio of recent 
appellate court decisions introduced above—Pickup v. Brown, 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, and King v. Governor of the 
State of New Jersey—demonstrate the confusion that this 
ambiguity has caused, and also reveal some of the problematic 
consequences that can result. With no definition of professional 
speech and no clear standard of review, lower courts and 
legislatures are free to continue to play the dichotomous “labeling 
game” that was of so much concern to Judge O’Scannlain. A more 
in-depth discussion of Pickup and Wollschlaeger will demonstrate 
some of the confusion and hint at some of its consequences, and a 
discussion of the Third Circuit’s formulaic approach in King will 
reveal how the introduction of an intermediate scrutiny standard 
can resolve the issues the “labeling game” creates. 
 
A. Pickup v. Brown 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, in Pickup v. Brown111 the 
Ninth Circuit considered a First Amendment challenge to 
                                                            
108 Id. at 233 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976)). 
109 See Post, supra note 25, at 980 (urging that the “analogy to commercial 
speech should not be pressed too far”). 
110 King, 767 F.3d at 235. 
111 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).  
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California Senate Bill 1172 (“SB 1172”), which prohibited “state-
licensed mental health provider[s]” from engaging in SOCE with 
patients under eighteen.112 The Ninth Circuit, having combined 
two district court cases which reached conflicting conclusions, 
ultimately held that SB 1172 regulated conduct and did not violate 
the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs.113  
The court began its analysis by determining whether the 
prohibition on SOCE constituted a regulation of conduct or 
speech.114 Relying upon two prior Ninth Circuit opinions—
National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. 
California Board of Psychology (“NAAP”) and Conant v. 
Walters115—the court concluded that, although “communication 
that occurs during psychotherapy does receive some constitutional 
protection . . . it is not immune from regulation.” 116 Then, turning 
to Casey and Lowe, the court conceptualized a “continuum” along 
which it could identify the First Amendment rights of 
                                                            
112 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2012).  
113 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222. 
114 Id. at 1225. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that SB 1172 did 
not do any of the following: (a) “Prevent mental health providers from 
communicating with the public about SOCE;” (b) “Prevent mental health 
providers from expressing their views to patients, whether children or adults, 
about SOCE, homosexuality, or any other topic;” (c) “Prevent mental health 
providers from recommending SOCE to patients, whether children or adults;” 
(d) “Prevent mental health providers from administering SOCE to any person 
who is 18 years of age or older;” (e) “Prevent mental health providers from 
referring minors to unlicensed counselors, such as religious leaders;” (f) 
“Prevent unlicensed providers, such as religious leaders, from administering 
SOCE to children or adults;” (g) “Prevent minors from seeking SOCE from 
mental health providers in other states.” Id. at 223.  
115 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1225. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of 
Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that California’s psychologist licensing laws did not violate physicians’ 
First Amendment rights, even though “some speech interest may be implicated” 
as the laws represented a valid, content neutral exercise of the state’s police 
power); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (enjoining a statute 
which threatened professional sanction for a physician who recommended the 
use of a controlled substance for medical purposes on the grounds that the 
“enforcement policy threatens to interfere with expression protected by the First 
Amendment”). 
116 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227. 
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professionals.117 The court stated that “[a]t one end of the 
continuum, where a professional is engaged in a public dialogue, 
First Amendment protection is at its greatest.”118 The court 
characterized this speech as “outside the doctor-patient 
relationship” and considered professionals engaging in it as 
“constitutionally equivalent to soapbox orators and 
pamphleteers.”119 The court then identified an intermediate point 
“within the confines of the professional relationship,” where the 
“First Amendment protection of a professional’s speech is 
somewhat diminished.”120 In these intermediate situations, 
according to the court, “the First Amendment tolerates a 
substantial amount of speech regulation.”121 At the far end of the 
continuum, the court identified the “regulation of professional 
conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though such 
regulation may have an incidental effect on speech.”122 Such 
regulation is “subject to only rational basis review and must be 
upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
interest.”123 
 In concluding that SB 1172 only regulated professional 
conduct, the court reasoned that SOCE constituted a medical 
treatment, not an expressive communication, and “the fact that 
speech may be used to carry out [SOCE did] not turn the regulation 
of conduct into a regulation of speech.”124 Relying on its own 
precedents in NAAP and Conant, and explicitly rejecting the 
applicability of Humanitarian Law Project,125 the court concluded 
that “the First Amendment does not prevent a state from regulating 
treatment even when the treatment is performed through speech 
alone.”126 Any effect SB 1172 “may have [had] on free speech 
                                                            
117 Id. at 1227–29. 
118 Id. at 1227. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 1228.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1229. 
123 Id. at 1231.  
124 Id. at 1229.  
125 Id. (“Plaintiffs contend that Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
supports their position. It does not.”). 
126 Id. at 1230. 
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interests [was] merely incidental” and did not alter the analysis.127  
When the court issued its order denying rehearing en banc, 
Judge O’Scannlain wrote a lengthy dissent in which he rejected the 
court’s rationale, arguing that the panel’s opinion “contravenes 
recent Supreme Court precedent, ignores established free speech 
doctrine, misreads [Ninth Circuit] cases, and . . . insulates from 
First Amendment scrutiny California’s prohibition—in the guise of 
a professional regulation—of politically unpopular expression.”128 
Judge O’Scannlain rejected the panel’s continuum as establishing a 
problematic speech/conduct dichotomy without providing any 
“principled doctrinal basis” for navigating it.129 He further 
contended that the panel’s labeling of certain verbal 
communications as “conduct” had the effect of creating “a 
potentially broad exception to the First Amendment for certain 
categories of speech.”130 He argued that Humanitarian Law 
Project clearly provided that “legislatures [could not] nullify the 
First Amendment’s protections for speech by playing [this] 
labeling game.”131 Judge O’Scannlain declined to assess the merits 
of the statute according to a more heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny,132 and concluded by warning that the panel’s “labeling 
game” approach would leave whole categories of speech, and 
perhaps disfavored speech in general, exempted from First 
Amendment protection.133 Although not discussed by Judge 
O’Scannlain, this labeling game could also undermine the state’s 
ability to protect its citizens against harmful practices like SOCE 
by characterizing verbal communications as speech and applying 
strict scrutiny, a problem illustrated in Welch v. Brown.  
 
                                                            
127 Id. at 1231.  
128 Id. at 1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing 
en banc). 
129 Id. at 1215–16. 
130 Id. at 1221. 
131 Id. at 1218. 
132 Id. at 1221. 
133 Id. at 1221 n.12 (“If a state may freely regulate speech uttered by 
professionals in the course of their practice without implicating the First 
Amendment, then targeting disfavored moral and political expression may only 
be a matter of creative legislative draftsmanship.”). 
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B. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida 
 
In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,134 the Eleventh 
Circuit dealt with a different type of statute than that at issue in 
Pickup or King, but one which involved a very similar analysis. In 
2011, Florida passed the “Firearm Owners Privacy Act” (“FOPA”) 
which prohibited licensed “health care practitioner[s]” and licensed 
“health care facilit[ies]” from asking questions about and keeping 
records on their patients’ firearm ownership.135 A group of 
plaintiffs, including individual physicians, the Florida Chapters of 
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of 
Family Physicians, and the American College of Physicians, 
challenged the law on First Amendment grounds.136 The Southern 
District of Florida granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction137 and, in a subsequent proceeding, granted the 
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.138 The District Court 
concluded that the Act “impose[d] restrictions on the content of 
                                                            
134 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).   
135 FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (2011). The Act contained several provisions that 
were also included in the Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. 
Id. § 381.026. Four provisions of FOPA were at issue. Id. The first—the record 
keeping provision—prohibited licensed practitioners from “intentionally 
enter[ing] any disclosed information concerning firearm ownership into the 
patient’s medical record if the practitioner knows that such information is not 
relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety of others.” Id. § 
790.338. The second—the inquiry provision—prohibited licensed practitioners 
“from making a written inquiry or asking questions concerning the ownership of 
a firearm or ammunition by the patient or by a family member of the patient, or 
the presence of a firearm in a private home or other domicile of the patient or a 
family member of the patient.” Id. The third—the discrimination provision—
prohibited licensed practitioners from “discriminat[ing] against a patient based 
solely upon the patient’s exercise of the constitutional right to own and possess 
firearms or ammunition.” Id. The fourth—the harassment provision—prohibited 
licensed practitioners “from unnecessarily harassing a patient about firearm 
ownership during an examination.” Id. 
136 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203.  
137 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1380, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 
2011). 
138 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
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practitioners’ speech” and that therefore strict scrutiny should be 
applied.139  
The Eleventh Circuit majority, on the other hand, concluded 
that all four challenged provisions were “valid regulations of 
professional conduct” with “only an incidental effect on 
physicians’ speech.”140 Balking at the District Court’s standard of 
review, the court held that because the challenged provisions 
regulated only medical treatment and not speech, they did not 
violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.141 Relying primarily 
on Lowe and Casey, the majority focused initially on the 
physician-patient relationship and applied Justice White’s 
reasoning that First Amendment protections diminish when a 
“personal nexus between professional and client” exists. 142 The 
majority cited with favor the Ninth Circuit’s continuum analysis in 
Pickup and ultimately adopted its reasoning.143 Although the 
majority discussed an intermediate point on the continuum of 
professional speech, it failed—like the Ninth Circuit panel—to 
fully define it or identify the standard by which it could be 
reviewed.144 The majority ultimately held that the Act did “not 
facially violate the First Amendment.”145 
                                                            
139 Wollschlaeger, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1380. 
140 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1217.  
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 1218 (quoting Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, 
J., concurring)) (“These protections are at their apex when a professional speaks 
to the public on matters of public concern; they approach a nadir, however, 
when the professional speaks privately, in the course of exercising his or her 
professional judgment, to a person receiving the professional’s services.”).   
143 Id. at 1225 (“Pickup is instructive as a recent example of a court 
applying Justice White’s reasoning in Lowe in conjunction with Casey to uphold 
a regulation of professional conduct with incidental effect on speech, outside of 
the context of a license requirement.”). 
144 Id. at 1223 (citing Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 
2013)) (“The Ninth Circuit placed the requirement that health care providers 
communicate certain information to patients that was challenged in Casey ‘at the 
midpoint of the continuum’ noting that the speech at issue took place ‘within the 
confines of a professional relationship.’”). 
145 Id. at 1217. As the Third Circuit noted in King when it discussed 
Wollschlaeger, the majority does “not explicitly identify the level of scrutiny [it 
applies].” King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 235 n.19 
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Judge Wilson penned a lengthy dissent, arguing that the court 
should apply either intermediate scrutiny or even strict scrutiny to 
the Florida statute.146 He began by stating that the majority 
incorrectly used Lowe to contend that, as long as a person is 
“operating within the confines of [a professional] relationship,” her 
speech can be regulated without First Amendment protection.147 
The majority impermissibly extended Lowe in a way foreclosed by 
subsequent cases, including Humanitarian Law Project.148 Judge 
Wilson also rejected the court’s use of Pickup, claiming that the 
majority used the case to establish the problematic speech/conduct 
dichotomy.149 Judge Wilson highlighted the way in which the 
majority glossed over Pickup’s recognition of a “midpoint [on] the 
[professional speech] continuum,” one which it recognized from its 
reading of Casey.150 The court engaged in the same type of 
“labeling game” as the Ninth Circuit in Pickup, despite the fact the 
SOCE could be considered a medical treatment—albeit a harmful 
one—while firearm inquiries and record keeping certainly could 
not.151 As such, the court should have adopted an intermediate 
                                                            
(3d Cir. 2014). The majority found FOPA to be a “valid regulation of 
professional conduct” but did not address whether it applied rational basis or no 
review at all. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1217. Judge Wilson, however, 
understood the majority to have applied rational basis review in its analysis. Id. 
at 1239–40 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
146 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1256 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
147 Id. at 1240 (“Lowe established only that the existence of a professional 
relationship is a necessary condition if a law burdening speech is to evade First 
Amendment scrutiny. Nothing in Lowe implied that such a condition was 
sufficient to support this conclusion.”). 
148 Id. at 1241. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2677 (2011) 
(applying heightened First Amendment scrutiny to a Vermont statute restricting 
the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records); Florida Bar. v. Went For It, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623–34 (1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a Florida 
statute prohibiting members of the Florida bar from sending direct-mail 
solicitations to victims for 30 days after an accident or disaster); Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (applying heightened scrutiny to a 
statute that prohibited providing “material support” to terrorist organizations 
when that support comes in the form of humanitarian and legal advocacy). 
149 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1247 (Wilson J., dissenting). 
150 Id. (citing Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2013)).  
151 Id. at 1248. 
Here, in stark contrast to Pickup where all of the burdened 
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scrutiny standard, as FOPA implicated the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights.152   
Judge Wilson’s dissent, in addition to criticizing the majority’s 
rationale, reflects Judge O’Scannlain’s concern regarding the 
potential consequences of a holding that eliminates professional 
speech from any First Amendment review.153 Judge Wilson 
contended that the majority’s holding created “a new category of 
speech immune from First Amendment review” in direct 
contradiction of Supreme Court precedent.154 The result, according 
to Judge Wilson, is far worse than Judge O’Scannlain warned in 
Pickup, however, as the majority’s holding, instead of merely 
creating a “labeling game” with the potential for abuse, forced all 
speech within a professional relationship into a category of 
“conduct” that receives no First Amendment protection.155  
                                                            
speech was the functional equivalent of providing a drug, none 
of the speech burdened by the Act fits in that exceedingly 
narrow category. Asking irrelevant questions about firearm 
ownership, recording the answers, or harassing a patient based 
on firearm ownership—by persistently and irritatingly 
discussing the subject—is nothing like giving a patient a drug 
or performing SOCE therapy.  
Id. Wilson recognizes here that, although he does use Pickup to support his 
position, he makes “no comment as to whether Pickup was correctly decided.” 
Id. His concern is rather with discrediting the majority’s reliance on it in 
supporting its position. Id.   
152 Id. at 1230–31. 
153 See id. at 1248 n.16 (stating that he shares Judge O’Scannlain’s concern 
that that the ability to label speech within a professional relationship as conduct 
would exempt regulations from any First Amendment protection).   
154 Id. at 1237. Judge Wilson also asserted that as a result of the court’s 
holding “all speech between professionals and patients/clients—so long as it 
occurs within the confines of a one-on-one professional relationship—can be 
burdened by States without scrutiny.” Id. 
155 Id. at 1248 n.16 (“The Majority proves the point by explaining that the 
line between unprotected conduct and protected speech in the professional 
setting is not clear here and indeed cannot be found. Shockingly, the Majority 
turns the absence of a clear dividing line between these very different categories 
of speech into an invitation for States to regulate all of it without scrutiny. If the 
court in Pickup erred, it did so by putting too much speech into the unprotected 
category. . . . The Majority has multiplied that error many times over.”). 
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C. King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey 
 
In King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, the Third 
Circuit dealt with a First Amendment challenge to a statute similar 
to California’s SB1172.156  New Jersey’s Assembly Bill A3371 
(“A3371”) prohibited persons “licensed to provide professional 
counseling” in the state from “engag[ing] in sexual orientation 
change efforts with a person under 18 years of age.”157 The New 
Jersey legislature relied upon the same medical publications cited 
by the California legislature and also expressly tailored the statute 
to protect minor patients.158 Doctors involved with SOCE and 
other advocacy groups challenged the statute, claiming that A3371 
violated their First Amendment free speech rights.159 The District 
of New Jersey, relying heavily on the reasoning in Pickup,160 
rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, saying that the 
statute regulated conduct and withstood rational basis review.161 
The Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court and 
upheld the statute, but concluded—unlike the courts in Pickup and 
Wollschlaeger—that the statute restricted speech and intermediate 
scrutiny should therefore apply.162 
The Third Circuit began its analysis by addressing whether the 
ban on SOCE—a “‘talk therapy’ that is administered wholly 
through verbal communication,”—constituted a restriction on 
                                                            
156 Compare Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(plaintiffs arguing that California’s prohibition on performing SOCE on minors 
violated their free speech rights); with King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 
F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (plaintiffs arguing that New Jersey’s prohibition on 
performing SOCE on minors violated their free speech rights). 
157 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-55 (West 2013).  
158 Id. 
159 King, 767 F.3d at 220–21. The plaintiffs in the case were Tara King, Ed. 
D., individually and on behalf of her patients; Ronald Newman, Ph.D., 
individually and on behalf of his patients; the National Association for Research 
and Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”); and the American Association of 
Christian Counsellors. Id.  
160 See King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 317–19 (D.N.J. 2013) 
(finding support for the conclusion that A3371 regulates conduct from the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis in Pickup). 
161 Id. at 303.  
162 King, 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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speech or a regulation of conduct.163 Phrased differently, the court 
began by asking “whether verbal communications become 
‘conduct’ when they are used as a vehicle for mental health 
treatment.”164 The court looked first to Humanitarian Law Project 
and disagreed with the Ninth Circuit as to its applicability. The 
court held, citing the reasoning of Judge O’Scannlain, that 
Humanitarian Law Project rejected “the argument that verbal 
communications become ‘conduct’ when they are used to deliver 
professional services” and that “the enterprise of labeling certain 
verbal or written communications ‘speech’ and others ‘conduct’ is 
unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation.”165 The court 
considered the verbal SOCE communications to be “speech for the 
purposes of the First Amendment” and rejected the “labeling 
game” approach taken by the Ninth Circuit and the District 
Court.166  
The court next turned to the question of “the level of First 
Amendment protection afforded to speech that occurs as part of the 
practice of a licensed profession.”167 The court first recognized, 
citing Lowe and Casey, that regulations that restrict “what a 
professional can and cannot say” reveal the uncomfortable tension 
between the police powers of the state and the First Amendment 
rights of professionals.168 Although the court could not 
characterize the verbal communications in SOCE as conduct, it 
also could not undermine New Jersey’s interest in protecting the 
general public from those whose “specialized knowledge” puts 
them in a position of authority—one which actors could use to 
                                                            
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 228 (“[W]hat the Supreme Court did not do [in Humanitarian Law 
Project] was reclassify this communication as ‘conduct’ based on the nature or 
function of what was communicated.”). 
166 Id. at 229. 
167 Id. Significantly, the court recognized here that the approach taken by 
the district court and the Ninth Circuit—the approach which characterized 
verbal communications as conduct—problematically “obscured [this] important 
constitutional inquiry.” Id. Because those courts held that the statutes merely 
regulated conduct, they never needed to decide the level of First Amendment 
scrutiny that should be applied to the statutes.  
168 Id. at 229–33. 
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manipulate and harm others if gone unchecked.169 The court 
concluded, therefore, “that a licensed professional does not enjoy 
the full protection of the First Amendment when speaking as part 
of the practice of her profession.”170 
Having decided that the type of professional speech that occurs 
in SOCE does not deserve full First Amendment protection, the 
court addressed whether it should receive “some lesser degree of 
protection or no protection at all.”171 Comparing professional 
speech to commercial speech,172 the court concluded that 
intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.173 
The court held that “a prohibition of professional speech is 
permissible only if it ‘directly advances’ the State’s substantial 
interest in protecting clients from ineffective or harmful 
professional services and is ‘not more extensive than necessary to 
serve that interest.’”174  
Once it had defined professional speech and articulated the 
applicable standard of scrutiny, the court evaluated the New Jersey 
                                                            
169 Id. at 232 (“To handcuff the State’s ability to regulate a profession 
whenever speech is involved would therefore unduly undermine its authority to 
protect its citizens from harm.”). 
170 Id. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the 
interpretations of Lowe and Casey in Moore-King, Pickup, and Wollschlaeger. 
Id. at 231–32. Although the court disagreed with many aspects of these other 
circuit court opinions, it did agree with the courts’ analyses regarding the 
diminished First Amendment protection for professional speech. Id. at 231. The 
Third Circuit did not ultimately agree that the finding of a “personal nexus 
between professional and client” meant that First Amendment protection 
disappeared, but it did recognize that such a nexus meant that First Amendment 
protection would be lessened. Id. at 232.  (“We believe a professional’s speech 
warrants lesser protection only when it is used to provide personalized services 
to a client based on the professional’s expert knowledge and judgment.”). 
171 Id. at 233–37. 
172 Id. at 233–35 (“We believe that commercial and professional speech 
share important qualities and, thus, that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard of review for prohibitions aimed at either category.”). 
173 Id. at 235. 
174 Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). The court recognized that the Fourth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits had all come to different conclusions about which 
standard of review to apply, but argued that Supreme Court precedent dictated 
that a more heightened scrutiny than rational basis should apply. Id. at 236.  
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statute’s constitutionality.175 The court found a compelling interest 
in protecting minors from harmful or ineffective practices and 
found that the statute directly advanced this interest.176 The court 
cited the legislative record—which contained widespread public 
condemnation of SOCE by “reputable professional and scientific 
organizations”—as evidence of SOCE’s ineffectiveness and 
potential harmfulness.177 The court then concluded that the statute 
was not “more extensive than necessary to protect [the State’s] 
interest.”178 Having subjected the statute to intermediate scrutiny, 
the court then held that A3371 was a constitutionally “permissible 
prohibition179 of professional speech.” 
The Third Circuit’s formulaic approach in King accomplished 
what the Supreme Court had failed to do in previous cases. The 
court presented an articulable definition of professional speech and 
clearly identified intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard 
of review. This approach can better guide lower courts dealing 
with statutes regulating professional speech and avoid the pitfalls 
of the “labeling game” approach.  
 
III. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY  
 
A. The Problems of the Speech/Conduct Dichotomy 
 
The reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit in Pickup and the 
Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger permits courts to arbitrarily 
label verbal communications as either speech or conduct.180 As 
                                                            
175 Id. at 237–40. 
176 Id. at 237–38. 
177 Id. at 238. 
178 Id. at 239. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the statute 
was overly burdensome and recognized that the state “is not required to employ 
the least restrictive means conceivable” as long as it “demonstrate[s] narrow 
tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest.” Id. (citing Greater 
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) 
(citations omitted)). Because A3371 had a “scope . . . in proportion to the 
interest served,” it demonstrated a sufficient degree of narrow tailoring to 
survive intermediate scrutiny. Id. 
179 Id. at 240. 
180 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2013); Wollschlaeger v. 
Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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Judge O’Scannlain noted, the method provides “no principled 
doctrinal basis” for establishing the dichotomy and no “criteria” by 
which later courts could navigate it.181 According to Judge 
O’Scannlain, the Supreme Court had previously “warned . . . 
inferior courts against arrogating to themselves ‘any freewheeling 
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of 
the First Amendment.’”182 In his estimation, the Ninth Circuit in 
Pickup—and the Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger—did exactly 
that, allowing future courts to find that “speech, uttered by 
professionals to their clients, does not actually constitute ‘speech’ 
for the purposes of the First Amendment.”183 Although Judge 
O’Scannlain primarily discussed the panel’s contravention of 
governing Supreme Court precedent and its misreading of 
applicable Ninth Circuit precedent,184 his dissent also demonstrates 
a concern for the practical consequences of the panel’s decision.185 
The “labeling game” approach—ultimately rejected by the Third 
Circuit—creates categories of speech exempt from First 
Amendment protection and impermissibly gives courts and 
legislatures the power to restrict both socially useful and politically 
unpopular speech by formulating the restriction as a “professional 
regulation.”186 Similarly, by “labeling” those same 
communications as speech deserving of full First Amendment 
protection, courts may undermine the state’s ability to fully and 
                                                            
181 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc).  
182 Id. at 1221 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 
(2012)).   
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1218 (“[T]o justify its purported speech/conduct dichotomy in the 
context of the professions, the panel instead invokes our decisions in [NAAP and 
Conant], as well as scattered citations of non-authoritative cases. Supreme Court 
precedent, however, as well as NAAP and Conant themselves, do not dictate 
such conclusion—rather, they counsel against it.”). 
185 Id. at 1215. 
186 Id. Once again, Judge Wilson criticizes the majority and the Florida 
legislature for this very reason. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 
1195, 1231 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“The poor fit between what 
the Act actually does and the interests it purportedly serves belies Florida’s true 
purpose in passing this Act: silencing doctors’ disfavored message about firearm 
safety.”). 
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legitimately exercise its police powers.187  
According to Judge O’Scannlain, the Ninth Circuit’s lack of a 
“principled doctrinal basis” for its holding only exacerbates the 
problems associated with the speech/conduct dichotomy.188 The 
panel does illustrate a continuum along which courts can consider 
“the First Amendment rights of professionals,” but, as both the 
Third Circuit and Judge Wilson recognized, this continuum lacks a 
clear method of application.189 The Third Circuit expressly 
declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s three categories as it found 
that the intermediate category and the conduct category usually 
become conflated.190 Judge Wilson, after declining to comment on 
whether Pickup was correctly decided,191 noted that he shared 
Judge O’Scannlain’s “concern that the difference between the 
intermediate category . . . and the unprotected category . . . may 
prove to be illusory.”192 The Third Circuit’s holding in King 
forecloses these concerns by clearly defining professional speech 
and explicitly adopting the intermediate scrutiny standard of 
review.  
 
B. The Benefits of Intermediate Scrutiny 
 
As Justice White noted in Lowe, cases that deal with 
regulations of professional speech involve a collision of 
interests.193 In the three cases discussed above the following three 
interests emerge: (a) the state’s interest in regulating professions, 
especially professions “which closely concern the public 
                                                            
187 King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2014).  
188 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
189 See King, 767 F.3d at 232 n.15; Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1248 n.16 
(Wilson, J., dissenting). 
190 King, 767 F.3d at 232 n.15. 
191 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1248 & n.16 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
192 Id. 1248 n.16. 
193 Lowe v. S.E.C. 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“This 
issue involves a collision between the power of government to license and 
regulate those who would pursue a profession or vocation and the rights of 
freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”). 
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health;”194 (b) the patients’ First Amendment interests in receiving 
beneficial information;195 and (c) the physicians’ First Amendment 
interests in their own speech rights.196 Preserving physicians’ 
speech rights also has the subsequent benefit of advancing the 
values that the First Amendment is meant to protect—values such 
as autonomy and democratic self-governance. The intermediate 
scrutiny standard better protects these values by preventing courts 
and legislatures from playing problematic “labeling games” with 
regard to professional speech regulations. State legislatures retain 
their ability to protect the public from harmful and ineffective 
practices, but the courts can still protect the First Amendment 
interests at stake in a doctor-patient relationship.   
The states’ ability to regulate the professions under their police 
powers is well established and is not challenged in any of the cases 
discussed above.197 The “labeling game” approach, however, 
significantly threatens this power by allowing courts to 
characterize the verbal communications of professionals as 
“speech” deserving of full First Amendment protection. This 
characterization can result in the invalidation of statutes that 
ultimately serve the state’s interests in protecting its citizens. In 
Welch v. Brown, the Eastern District of California subjected SB 
1172 to strict scrutiny and enjoined its enforcement.198 Although 
                                                            
194 King, 767 F.3d at 229 (citing Watson v. State of Maryland, 218 U.S. 
173, 176 (1910)). The Supreme Court in Watson found this principle “too well 
settled to require discussion.” Watson, 218 U.S. at 176. 
195 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (recognizing that First Amendment protection extends 
to both the source and the recipients of speech); see also King, 760 F.3d at 1258 
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s holding violates patients’ 
First Amendment rights to receive potentially beneficial information from their 
physicians). 
196 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1258 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Doctors thus 
have a significant interest in speaking freely, making inquiries, and recording 
patients’ answers.”). 
197 See King, 767 F.3d at 229 (citing Watson v. State of Maryland, 218 U.S. 
173, 176 (1910)).  
198 Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 
(enjoining the enforcement of SB 1172 as it lacked content and viewpoint 
neutrality and likely could not withstand strict scrutiny) rev’d sub nom. Pickup 
v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, the District Court’s 
reasoning demonstrates how a failure to fully define professional 
speech and identify a standard of review can ultimately undermine 
an important state interest—here, the protection of vulnerable 
youth subjected to the dangers associated with SOCE.199 The 
California legislature, in enacting SB 1172, relied upon “the well-
documented, prevailing opinion of the medical and psychological 
community that SOCE had not been shown to be effective and that 
it create[d] a potential risk of harm to those who experience[d] 
it.”200 The Welch court acknowledged this evidence in its opinion, 
but relied upon it only to support its holding that the statute lacked 
content neutrality.201 The Third Circuit, on the other hand, 
considered almost identical evidence in its determination that 
A3371 directly advanced the state’s interest in protecting minors 
from the harms of SOCE.202 Laws like SB 1172 and A3371 reflect 
                                                            
199 Interestingly, the District Court relied upon the same Supreme Court 
and Ninth Circuit authority in concluding that strict scrutiny should apply. The 
court argued that “[t]he lower levels of review contemplated in Lowe and Casey 
thus do not appear to apply if a law imposes restrictions on a professional’s 
speech.” Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. The court also used the reasoning in 
NAAP and Conant to conclude that strict scrutiny should apply, diverging from 
the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in its determination that the statute lacked content 
and viewpoint neutrality. Id.  
200 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1223 (9th Cir. 2013). The legislature 
cited directly “position statements, articles, and reports” published by the 
American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the 
American School Counselor Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
the American Medical Association, the National Association of Social Workers, 
the American Counseling Association, the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and 
the Pan American Health Organization, all of which affirmed the inefficacy of 
SOCE and some of which warned about its potential dangers. S.B. 1172, 2011-
2012 Sess. (Cal. 2012); see also supra, Part II.A.  
201 Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“The 
Legislature’s findings and declarations . . . bring SB 1172 within the content-
based exception” wherein “intermediate scrutiny does not apply.”), rev’d sub 
nom. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013). 
202 King, 767 F.3d at 238–39 (“We conclude that New Jersey has satisfied 
[its burden to establish that A3371 directly advances the state’s interest]. The 
legislative record demonstrates that over the last few decades a number of well-
known, reputable professional and scientific organizations have publicly 
condemned the practice of SOCE, expressing serious concerns about its 
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the legislatures’ reaction to the weight of medical evidence 
condemning a harmful medical practice, and the intermediate 
scrutiny standard allows for courts to uphold those laws, even if 
speech rights are implicated, so long as they “directly advance” a 
state interest and “are not more extensive than necessary.”203  
Conversely, the intermediate scrutiny standard also allows for 
courts to ensure that states do not abuse their police powers by 
enacting statutes that purport to “prohibit the provision of harmful 
or ineffective professional services” but instead serve “to inhibit 
politically-disfavored messages.”204 In his Wollschlaeger dissent, 
Judge Wilson recognized the importance of the state’s asserted 
interests in defending FOPA.205 He argued, however, that the state 
offered “no evidence to show that those rights [were] under threat” 
or that FOPA “either directly or materially” advanced the interests 
proposed. 206 This disconnect between the asserted interest and the 
advancement of that interest led Judge Wilson to conclude that 
“Florida’s true purpose in passing” FOPA was to “[silence] 
doctors’ disfavored message about firearm safety.”207 Unlike Judge 
O’Scannlain, who declined to assess the merits of SB 1172 under 
any level of scrutiny,208 Judge Wilson applied the intermediate 
                                                            
potential to inflict harm.”). 
203 See id. at 237 (“The New Jersey legislature has targeted SOCE 
counseling for prohibition because it was presented with evidence that this 
particular form of counseling is ineffective and potentially harmful to clients.”); 
see also, Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering 
Partisan Interests at the Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 
322–28 (2014) (providing a more in depth analysis of the medical evidence 
supporting California’s SB 1172). 
204 King, 767 F.3d at 236. 
205 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195, 1230–31 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“The State’s asserted interests in protecting 
the rights of firearm owners, including their privacy rights, their rights to be free 
from harassment and discrimination, and their ability to access medical care, are 
incredibly important.”). 
206 Id. at 1231.  
207 Id.  
208 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2013) (O’Scannlain, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Although no Judge applies 
intermediate scrutiny to SB 1172, the Third Circuit’s review of A3371 certainly 
mirrors what that application would entail, especially considering the depth with 
which the Third Circuit analyzed the Pickup opinion. See King, 767 F.3d at 224–
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scrutiny standard and found that each challenged provision failed 
to survive the inquiry.209 Mirroring the Third Circuit’s reasoning in 
adopting the intermediate scrutiny standard, Judge Wilson 
concluded his First Amendment analysis by recognizing that 
“[i]ntermediate scrutiny standards ensure not only that the State’s 
interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed upon 
speech but also that the law does not seek to suppress a disfavored 
message.”210  
In a similar way, the intermediate scrutiny standard also 
protects the First Amendment rights of patients. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, both the source 
and the recipient of communication are afforded the protection of 
the First Amendment.211 The “labeling game” approach 
undermines this interest by potentially limiting the beneficial 
information a patient can receive from her doctor, even when the 
limitation does not advance any government interest. Judge Wilson 
addressed this point directly in his dissent when he recognized that 
FOPA burdens a patient’s right to receive information about the 
dangers of firearms by prohibiting “even the opening question in 
the firearm conversation.”212 The intermediate standard more 
adequately protects the patient’s First Amendment right to receive 
information that may ultimately prove beneficial. In the medical 
context this is especially significant as the information being 
restricted is often information that is unavailable elsewhere and 
can potentially be life-saving.213 The standard ultimately ensures 
that if courts or legislatures limit that right, the limitation “directly 
advances” a government interest and “is not more extensive than 
necessary.”214 
For this same reason, intermediate scrutiny also serves to better 
protect the First Amendment rights of medical professionals as it 
                                                            
29. 
209 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1257–67 (Wilson, J., dissenting).  
210 Id. at 1267 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2688 
(2011)). 
211 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 756 (1976). 
212 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1257 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
213 Id. 
214 King, 767 F.3d at 239 (citation omitted). 
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permits courts to assess the proportionality of the state’s interests 
and the subsequent First Amendment burdens. According to the 
Supreme Court, the practice of medicine is “subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the state,”215 but, as the Ninth Circuit 
noted in Conant, “being a member of a regulated profession does 
not . . . result in a surrender of First Amendment rights.”216 Both 
the panel in Pickup and the majority in Wollschlaeger use the 
“personal nexus” analysis from Lowe to categorically remove 
physicians’ verbal communications from the realm of First 
Amendment protection.217 An intermediate scrutiny standard 
prevents this from happening arbitrarily,218 and in the process 
preserves important First Amendment values that are enhanced by 
physicians’ speech, even when that speech occurs pursuant to the 
physician-patient relationship. 
First, providing physicians with First Amendment protection—
even diminished First Amendment protection—effectively 
promotes the liberty theory of the First Amendment.219 According 
to the liberty theory, “the free speech clause protects . . . an arena 
of individual liberty from certain types of governmental 
restrictions. Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good 
but because of the value of speech conduct to the individual.”220 
                                                            
215 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
216 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002). 
217 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013) (“At the other 
end of the continuum, and where we conclude that SB 1172 lands, is the 
regulation of professional conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though 
such regulation may have an incidental effect on speech.”); Wollschlaeger, 760 
F.3d at 1217 (“We find that the Act is a valid regulation of professional conduct 
that has only an incidental effect on physicians’ speech. As such the Act does 
not facially violate the First Amendment.”).  
218 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (arguing that the panel’s “labeling game” approach was only 
exacerbated by the lack of a “principled doctrinal basis” for adopting and 
applying it). 
219 See Keighley, supra note 25, at 2373–74 (arguing that the liberty theory 
should restrict the state’s ability to compel physicians’ speech in the context of 
informed consent abortion statutes, especially when the speech compelled does 
no more than espouse the state’s ideological beliefs).  
220 Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978).  
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Under this theory “free speech . . . has constitutional value because 
of its important role in protecting an individual’s autonomy and 
right of self-definition.”221 Although the Third Circuit did not 
address this idea in its adoption of intermediate scrutiny, the 
standard more effectively protects it. For example, as Judge 
Wilson noted in his dissent, FOPA prevented physicians from 
engaging in speech consistent both with their own beliefs and with 
established medical authority, all pursuant to a legislative interest 
in inhibiting a disfavored political message.222 Because the 
majority adopted the “labeling game” approach and characterized 
the physicians’ verbal communications as conduct, the plaintiffs 
were prevented from speaking—a direct contravention of their 
autonomy interests—even though the statute did not directly 
advance an important state interest.223 Medical professionals may 
only receive diminished First Amendment protection, but, by 
preventing courts and legislatures from eliminating that protection 
entirely, the intermediate scrutiny standard promotes the 
physicians’ liberty and autonomy interests.  
Providing physicians with First Amendment protection also 
promotes the democratic self-governance theory of the First 
Amendment.224 This theory “is premised on the belief that free 
expression is necessary for the proper functioning of government 
and democracy.”225 It is pursuant to this theory that the Supreme 
Court held that commercial speech receives First Amendment 
                                                            
221 Keighley, supra note 25, at 2373. 
222 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1233 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
223 Id. 
224 See Keighley, supra note 25, at 2371 (2013) (“A more persuasive 
rationale for extending the First Amendment to physician speech can be found in 
the democratic self-government theory.”); Post, supra note 25, at 974 (arguing 
that the First Amendment that has been extended to commercial speech should 
be extended to the speech of physicians, as the same interests are served by 
both).  
225 Clay Calvert et al., Conversion Therapy and Free Speech: A Doctrinal 
and Theoretical First Amendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
525, 565 (2014); see also Keighley, supra note 25, at 2371–72  (“Under this 
theory, the First Amendment’s scope should be interpreted in light of the 
amendment’s ultimate goal: a well-informed citizenry that can make wise voting 
decisions, thus ensuring the success of democratic self-government.”). 
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protection, albeit diminished protection.226 As Dean Post notes, 
“[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so 
much because it pertains to the seller’s business as because it 
furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of commercial 
information.’”227 Despite the fact that the physician-patient 
engagement generally takes place in a private sphere, Dean Post 
argues “[t]hat there is significant precedent . . . for the extension of 
First Amendment value to speech that is not in itself public 
discourse, but that is nevertheless constitutionally understood as 
communicating information necessary to ‘enlighten public 
decisionmaking in a democracy.’”228 Physician speech is 
significant in this context, even within a physician-patient 
relationship, as it can contribute to how members of the public 
“think about the provision of medical care generally.”229 As 
opposed to the “labeling game” approach, the Third Circuit’s 
intermediate scrutiny standard, premised on the protections the 
Supreme Court provided for commercial speech, allows for the 
“content of physician-patient communications” to contribute to the 
“formation of public opinion” and the promotion of the First 
Amendment’s democratic self-governance function.230 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The Third Circuit’s approach in King can bring much needed 
consistency and stability to an important area of constitutional 
jurisprudence now characterized by confusion and ambiguity. By 
foreclosing the dichotomy between speech and conduct, the 
                                                            
226 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976); see also Post, supra note 25, at 974 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the 
information such speech provides.”). 
227 Post, supra note 25, at 974 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
228 Id. at 976 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)). 
229 Id. at 978.  
230 Id. at 974.  
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intermediate scrutiny approach can better protect the states’ 
interest in prohibiting potentially harmful or ineffective 
professional practices, and at the same time decrease the potential 
for state legislatures to inhibit disfavored political messages. The 
approach can also better protect the patient’s and physician’s First 
Amendment rights and the values that those rights advance. This 
dichotomy has allowed courts to insulate categories of speech from 
First Amendment protection by characterizing as “conduct” verbal 
communications from professionals to clients and patients. The 
approach can also, as evidenced in Judge Wilson’s dissent, force 
state lawmakers to more carefully draft legislation that may 
implicate the First Amendment rights of professionals. Although 
King does not bind any of the other circuits, the implicit benefits of 
the Third Circuit’s approach may persuade other circuits to follow 
suit. 
The Supreme Court will ultimately decide how to define 
professional speech and will decide the standard by which 
regulations restricting such speech will be scrutinized. The Third 
Circuit’s formulaic analysis, however, especially when considered 
alongside that of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, may convince 
the Court to adopt the intermediate scrutiny standard moving 
forward. As cases like Wollschlaeger and Pickup demonstrate, the 
application of rational basis review to statutes that regulate the 
communications of professionals runs the serious risk of under-
protecting both socially valuable and politically disfavored speech. 
As Welch v. Brown clearly shows, the application of strict scrutiny, 
and the subsequent over-protection of those communications, can 
leave states unable to protect their citizens from harmful 
professional practices. The problem with the labeling game 
approach is not only that it allows these outcomes, but that it 
allows them to happen arbitrarily, as the contours of professional 
speech are difficult to identify. The Third Circuit’s approach 
provides clarity and, more significantly, principle, to this difficult 
area of the law and the Supreme Court would be wise to adopt it as 
their own approach to professional speech moving forward.  
 
